This paper explicitly models strategic interaction between two independent national fiscal authorities and a single central bank in a simple New Keynesian model of a monetary union. Closed analytical solutions for the policy instruments are computed for several strategic games. In this set-up the analytical results of a monetary leadership regime coincides with the one of a Nash game. The analytical results depend highly non-linear on parameters of the model. Thus, impulse response graphs to various shocks are discussed. It depends on the shock (symmetric or asymmetric) whether the policy regime of fiscal leadership performs better than the one of a Nash game. JEL-Classification: E62, E63, F33
Introduction
The New Keynesian approach is widely used in macroeconomics to analyze monetary policy. There is hardly any disagreement about the role and functions of monetary policy in this consensus approach. 1 This kind of model has been criticized for many missing elements and work is still in progress to overcome these criticism. But one of the main weaknesses of the New Keynesian models is the absence of an explicit role for fiscal policy. 2 This is at odds with the large size of the public sector in modern economics, and the increasing role governments play for the solution of the current financial crisis and the related great recession. 3 Christiano et al. (2009) and Woodford (2010) among others start to analyze the increasing role of fiscal policy due to the 2007-2009 crisis. Monetary policy is ineffective in two cases, first, if the economy is in a liquidity trap and second, if a monetary union is hit by asymmetric shocks which cancel on the union level. This implies that fiscal policy might play a more prominent role.
With the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 macroeconomic conditions have changed for all EU member countries. By handing over monetary policy to an independent and unique central bank for all members national governments cannot use monetary policy as a stabilization tool any longer. On matters of fiscal policy each member country is assumed to maintain the autonomy of its own fiscal policy, but the Stability and Growth pact (SGP) with its thresholds for debt-GDP ratio of 60% and deficit-GDP ratio of 3% was intended to discipline national governments to ensure monetary stability. Thus, having to obey the fiscal constraints of the SGP the stabilization role of fiscal policy is hampered. As a consequence a very important question concerning the optimal monetary-fiscal policy regime in the current policy framework of the EMU is whether there is still a role for fiscal policies to serve as potential stabilization tools of cyclical fluctuations.
However, fiscal policy is conducted to serve national interests rather than union interest. But in a highly integrated region like a monetary union the stabilization of asymmetric shocks might lead to spill-overs on other members. This raises the question whether a coordination of fiscal policies is more likely to be welfare enhancing. Moreover, it might be possible for fiscal authorities to strengthen their policy tools if the governments coordinate. This paper tries to give answers to these questions. To be more precise, different strategic games between two fiscal authorities and the common central bank are studied with the help of a simple consensus model which builds on advances made in the analysis of monetary policy, namely the New Keynesian model with imperfect competition, price rigidities and rational expectations.
The focus is on a two-country model of a monetary union. Each country is hit by cost-push shocks or deficit spending shocks. National governments set government spending financed by lump-sum taxes. Foremost the paper abstracts from debt dynamics. The outcome of different kind of games played by the fiscal and monetary authorities are explored. It is assumed that governments and the central bank maximize appropriate welfare functions in order to set their instruments optimally, but policy authorities do not follow rules for fiscal and monetary policy. Moreover, all policy makers cannot commit to future policies on assumption. Therefore, the focus is on discretionary policy making. In contrast to the current research it is allowed for non-coordination focusing on a Nash equilibrium. This result is compared to different other possible strategic interactions between independent national fiscal policies and a centralized monetary policy.
Previous literature on this issue assumes coordination of both monetary and national fiscal policies, i.e. the existence of a supra-national authority which decides how to set instruments. Both monetary policy and fiscal policy within New Keynesian models for one single country are considered by Schmitt-Groh and Uribe (2006) or Benigno and Woodford (2003) among others. In the field of open economy macroeconomic literature focusing on currency areas modeled with the help of general dynamic equilibrium models with micro-foundation, Benigno (2004) investigates in a two-country model how monetary policy should be conducted in a monetary union which is hit by asymmetric shocks across regions. Beetsma and Jensen (2004) and Beetsma and Jensen (2005) extend the above two-country model including fiscal policy in form of government spending as an active stabilization tool. They analyze the performance of several monetary and fiscal policy rules in a currency union where all three authorities coordinate their policies in order to maximize union-wide welfare. Ferrero (2009) uses a similar set-up but in his model exogenous government spending is financed by distortionary taxes and riskless bonds. He determines optimal fiscal and monetary rules when policy is conducted in a coordinated fashion. Galí and Monacelli (2008) discuss the benchmark case of coordination when the monetary union consists of a continuum of small open economies. Forlati (2009) ... Lambertini (2007) analyzes optimal fiscal policy (i.e. solution under commitment of the Ramsey problem) in a monetary union when the central bank follows an interest rate rule. In this set-up governments set labor income taxes and issue public debt to finance stochastic government spending. It is optimal for governments to run a deficit and raise income taxes. Public debt is not inflated away by monetary policy as the central bank follows a Taylor rule, but follows a random walk. 4 .
The main contribution of this paper is to characterize the solution to the problem in analytical form. In order to find analytical closed solutions to different policy regimes (benchmark scenario of full coordination, the case of non-coordination Nash regime, or fiscal leadership and monetary leadership regimes) a simple consensus model of the New Keynesian framework is used. The set-up is kept as simple as possible since more dynamics in a model make it harder to find analytical solutions. Moreover, this model better helps to identify and understand transmission mechanisms of different policies.
The key findings of this paper are the following: First, it is noteworthy that the analytical results in case of monetary leadership coincide with the ones for the Nash regime of noncoordination. Second, as in a closed economy, monetary policy focuses on aggregate shocks and faces the same trade-off between inflation rate stabilization and output gap stabilization on the union level in all regimes. But interest rates are set differently as the central bank takes into account how aggregate fiscal policy reacts to the shocks. Third, results of the instruments and country-specific output gap and inflation rate depend on the country size in the case of the Nash game and the fiscal leadership game. Though the most simplest form of equations has been chosen some of the analytical results are no longer straightforward and depend non-linearly on parameters of the model. To visualize the results the model is calibrated and and impulse responses to the underlying shocks are plotted. It depends on the shock whether the policy regime of fiscal leadership performs better than the one of a Nash game. Moreover, in the case of symmetric shocks, impulse responses for the country-specific output gap and inflation rate to a cost-push are identical for all policy regimes if both countries are equally sized. Only the reactions of the policy instruments differ. This result still holds in the case of the benchmark case and the non-coordination case if the countries are of different size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the key equations of the economic model. The next section 3 introduces the policy problem of the economy. In section 4 the case of joint coordination is analyzed whereas in sections 5 to 7 the different policy regimes are analyzed and analytical results are obtained. Section 8 compares welfare effects of the various regimes. Impulse response functions to the different shocks are depicted in section 9. The last section concludes.
A consensus model
In this section a standard-version of the New Keynesian model like the one in Clarida et al. (1999) is laid out. The core of the model can be summarized in three equations, a New Keynesian IS-curve, a dynamic Phillips curve and an equation which describes the behavior of the policy maker, usually a Taylor rule for the central bank. As the aim of the paper is the analysis of discretionary policy-making which is not based on the following of rules the latter equation will be replaced by an optimal response of the policy maker in the section about policy making.
A monetary union consists of two countries, the H(ome) and the F (oreign) country. The economic conditions of each member country j = H, F of the monetary union can be described by an aggregate demand (IS-) curve and an aggregate supply (or Phillips) curve which are given by:
All variables should be read as deviations from their respective values at an efficient steady state.
County-specific demand is related inversely to the nominal interest rateῑ which is set by the monetary policy and which is the same for both countries. So, real interest rates differ due to possible different inflation expectations. g j t is a demand shock. Clarida et al. (1999) interpret this as government spending or tax cuts. In this paper a slightly different interpretation is used. The variable g j t should be read as government deficits, so an increase in g j t is due to either an increase in governments spending or a tax cut. Governments try to run a balanced budget, but as in Uhlig (2003) the assumption is imposed that governments are hit by fiscal shocks ε j t to their budget constraint. Though the model is dynamic in nature, debt dynamics are not included at this stage because introducing debts makes the set-up more complicated with the results that it is harder to obtain closed analytical results. The role of ε j t gets clear when introducing policy objectives.
Inflation dynamics are driven by forward-looking elements, the output gap and a countryspecific cost-push shock u Before proceeding the following useful notation for a generic variable x is introduced. With 
3 The policy problem
Two independent governments and an independent monetary authority, a central bank in the monetary union are considered. As policy authorities do not set their instruments by following a rule, but choose their instruments optimally by maximizing an appropriate welfare criterion, a loss function to each of the three players is assigned.
These will be postulated ad hoc in this paper in contrast to the current approach in research of deriving a welfare criterion based on a second-order Taylor approximation of a weighted average of utilities of all consumers in the union. In general, this leads to a quadratic loss function that measures welfare losses of deviations from an efficient steady state.
The common central bank focuses on aggregate variables of the monetary union and thus includes the aggregate inflation rate π W t and the aggregate output gap x W t in the central bank's loss function. Instrument is the nominal interest rate.
where α > 0 denotes the relative weight of inflation over output. 5
In contrast, the fiscal authorities focus on national output, are not concerned about inflation, but, as in Uhlig (2003), they include deviations of government spending g j t , j = H, F from the shock ε into their loss function. Instrument is government spending g j t , j = H, F . They finance this stream of public spending g j t , j = H, F for goods produced in the own country (complete home bias) by collecting lump-sum taxes so that government budget balances each period.
As all three policy makers do not coordinate in setting their instruments the timing of policy actions is relevant for the analysis. Nash, leadership and coordinated equilibria are analyzed.
Arguments for and against each kind of game can be derived. A Nash equilibrium in a monetary union seems plausible as actual policy reveals that policy authorities hardly coordinate.
Rather they set their instruments independently of each other. If one is convinced of the argument that time-lags in fiscal policy between recognition of a shock and hence a necessity to implement a new policy action and the implementation itself, are longer than in monetary policy, a Stackelberg game with the central bank as a leader (in setting its instruments) and the two governments reacting to the monetary decision is the appropriate framework to analyze stabilization policy. Finally, the argument that monetary policy reacts on the decisions made by fiscal policy to stabilize inflation is in favor of a leadership concept with the governments as first mover.
All policy plans are compared to the optimal policy plan which a single social planner implements. The benevolent social planner chooses all fiscal and monetary instruments in order to maximize union-wide welfare.
This paper describes the results of discretionary policy, i.e. under assumption no policy authority can commit to future policy choices. Optimal policy under discretion describes best reality, as no major central bank makes any kind of binding commitment (Clarida et al., 1999) . Regarding governments even within the limits imposed by the SGP fiscal policy is conducted in a discretionary manner.
Benchmark: Joint coordination
Before analyzing all different kind of strategic interaction the benchmark of full coordination of all three policy makers has to be explored. On assumption both governments and the central bank set their instruments to minimize welfare losses of a representative agent of the monetary union as if there is one single authority maximizing welfare of a representative household living in the monetary union assuming that it is a single country where the household faces an (aggregated) inflation rate π W t and an (aggregated) output gap y W t . But the single authority takes into account that the two regions may be hit by inflation differential, i.e. the authority takes relative inflation rates π R t into account. Fluctuations in the terms of trade lead to fluctuations in production across countries as relative prices allocate resources within the union (Ferrero, 2009) or (Benigno, 2004 
To summarize, the single authority wants to stabilize the economy of the whole monetary union according to the following welfare criterion
where α, θ, and µ are positive constants denoting the relative weight of output, government spending and the relative inflation rate.
Constraints are given by the aggregate and relative demand and Phillips curves
Note that (8) is used to calculate the nominal interest ratē
First-order conditions with respect toῑ t , g W t , and g R t are given by
The first optimality condition leads to the well-known trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and the output gap. Assuming that u W t follows an AR(1) process with coefficient ρ W u the results are given by
Together with the second equation, the first one yields
and hence with equation (12) the optimal nominal interest rate given bȳ
where q = 1/(λ 2 + α(1 − βρ)), and γ π = 1 +
Simplifying further leads to 6
The third first-order condition results in equal inflation rates of both countries, i.e.
This result and the Phillips curves (2) determine the output gaps of both countries which are given by
With the help of the demand curves (1) the governmental instruments can be determined
To conclude, in the benchmark case the nominal interest rate helps to stabilize the trade-off between the output gap and the aggregate inflation rate due to the aggregate output shock. Moreover, the nominal interest rate is set taking into account the fiscal deficit spending shock ε W t . Aggregate government spending is set to stabilize this fiscal shock, but does not react to the aggregate cost-push shock which is in line with the case in the closed economy. But in contrast, relative government spending g R t reacts to the relative cost-push shock, but not to aggregate cost-push shock as can be seen by substracting (38) from (38). Country-specific government spending take into account the shock which hits the economy as well as the shock which hits the neighbor.
Simultaneous decisions of all policy-makers
In this section the targeting rules for both governments and the central bank are derived assuming that all three policy makers do not coordinate and set their instrument independently of the others.
In this case the timing of the events is as follows. Considering discretionary policy expectations of the private sector on inflation have been made beforehand, i.e. expectations E t π j t+1 , j = H, F are given for all policy makers. The monetary union is hit by the cost-push shocks u j t and the fiscal shocks ε j t , j = H, F at the same time. The policy makers observe these shocks, then they set their instruments.
The problem of the central bank is to maximize (5) with respect to the interest rate taking as given government spending of the home and the foreign country. The results are given by the trade-off between stabilizing the aggregate inflation rate and the aggregate output gap (13) and (14).
Optimal responses of fiscal policies are the results of optimizing (6) subject to the structural equations (1) and (2). For j = H, F these are given by
Combining this result for j = H, F and inserting (14) leads to aggregate government spending
In contrast to the benchmark scenario in which aggregate government spending just focuses on government spending shocks (see equation (15)), in this case fiscal policy also reacts to aggregate cost-push shocks.
Using (12) the nominal interest rate is given by 7
In the next step the results for relative variables are computed. Together with the results for the aggregate variables derived above and with the help of the relations for the home and foreign variables (??) and (??) country-specific government spending, output gaps and inflation rates can be found (Aoki's method).
Optimal fiscal responses (22) lead to
This is inserted into equation (11). The result forms together with (10) a system of two equations in two unknowns π R t and x R t with forward-looking rational expectations which is solved using the method of undetermined coefficients. 8 As a result the relative output gap and relative inflation rate are given by
with the coefficients spelled out in the appendix B.
With these equations relative government spending can be computed
This equation, together with (23), implies the following results for home and foreign government spending which are a combination of the following shocks
Inflation in the home resp. foreign country are given by
8 Refer to Appendix B for details.
For output the following equations can be derived
This implies that not only the country specific shocks play a role in setting the instrument to stabilize the country economy but as well spill over effects are observable due to the common interest rate.
Comparing these results with the benchmark results: everything is much more complicated ... comparing this with simple static model... everything is much more complicated...
Fiscal leadership
In the policy regime of fiscal leadership the timing of events can be described as follow. First expectations are formed, then the shocks occur. Government spending are set by both countries simultaneously. Finally the central bank sets the nominal interest rate.
Solving this problem backwards gives in the final stage the usual trade-off between stabilizing aggregate output gap and aggregate inflation rate as given by (13) and (14). The nominal interest rate is set according to equation (12). Fiscal policy takes this nominal inflation rate into account. Thus governments optimize (6) with respect to the following IS-equation
resulting in the following optimal responses
These two equations imply for relative government spending
where in the last equation (??) and (??) have been inserted.
Aggregate government spending is given by
Inserting the relation ship for relative optimal responses of governments into the relative IScurve (11) and using the relative Phillips curve (10), analogue to the previous case this results in a system of linear difference equations with forward looking rational expectations which can be solved with the method of undetermined coefficients as is done in appendix C.
Thus relative inflation and output are given by 
This implies the following results
Country specific governments spending are given by
Discussing the results: It is obvious that the results differ from the ones of the other policy regimes, all depend on the country size...
Concerning parameters: Looking at the coefficients (spelled out in the appendix) of the fiscal leadership, the following points can be observed: If n is equal to 1/2 then, c
Monetary leadership
In the policy regime of monetary leadership by assumption the central bank first sets the nominal interest rate, then both governments react simultaneously and set government spending.
As in the previous case this game is solved by backward induction. First, considering the problem of the governments, leads to the optimal responses (22). Combining both equations to aggregate government spending g W t results in (23). This is inserted into the aggregate IS-curve (8) to yield
This is the constraint the central bank takes into account when minimizing the monetary loss function (5). As the constant θ θ+1 is just a scaling factor the optimal response of the monetary authority is the same as in the benchmark case, and both the scenarios of Nash and fiscal leadership. As a result, optimal aggregate government spending is given as in the case of the Nash game by (23). As a consequence, the results of the case of monetary leadership are the same as in the case of simultaneous decision of all policy makers. Table 1 gives an overview of all analytical results.
Welfare effects
In this section welfare effects under the various policy regimes are computed. 
Fiscal leadership
Assuming that the economy is initially in its steady state and assuming that all equilibrium sequences are covariance stationary the loss function can be computed as
V arx denotes the unconditional variance (here, conditional on the information available at the beginning of period 0) of π t .
9 Simulating the model
Calibration
To visualize the dynamic behavior of the model impulse response functions to different shocks (especially symmetric and asymmetric) are depicted in this section. Therefor the following values are assigned to the parameters: The discount factor β is set to 0.99. Following Galí (2008) the parameter ϕ is set to be equal to 1 and the parameter λ is set to be equal to 0.0425. 9 The monetary policy sets the weight on output stabilization to 0.5. In contrast, governments want to stabilize output and put more weight on output stabilization (θ = 0.1). Shocks are assumed to be highly persistent with a coefficient ρ j of 0.9.
As the results depend on the choice of n as is shown next various values for the country size are assumed.
The parameters are summarized in table 2. As Galí (2008) shows λ =
where all the parameters are deep structural ones coming from a proper microfoundation. Taking over the values Galí (2008) assigns to all these parameters, namely α = 1/3, = 6, and θ λ = 2/3, implies the given value for λ. Figure 1: Impulse responses of policy instruments in case of a home cost push shock for different values of n, Nash game As the analytical results suggests the policy instruments depend on the country size n among other parameters in some cases. In other words, changing n results in setting the instruments differently. As an example impulse response functions of the interest rate and home and foreign government spending to a cost-push shock which hits the home country are depicted for different values of n in figure 1. These are computed for the scenario of uncoordinated policy (Nash game). In all three cases the nominal interest rate reacts positively to the shock, but is set higher the higher the home country size is as this country is hit by the shock. From the point of view of the foreign country, fiscal policy reacts to the shock in the neighbor country more aggressively the bigger the home country is though the shock has not hit the foreign country. The reaction of the home government spending alters with the size of n from a negative reaction (small country size) to a positive one (big country size).
In the same line, figure 2 shows the extreme results of the three policy instruments in the scenario of fiscal leadership when the monetary union is hit by asymmetric fiscal shocks. 
Asymmetric shocks, equal country size
Impulse response functions of the policy instruments to asymmetric cost-push shocks u H t = −u F t are given by figure 3. On assumption both countries are of the same size n = 1/2. In this case the weighted average of both shocks is equal to zero and the relative shock is given by u R t = −2u H t . As for the central bank the whole monetary union is not hit by any shock monetary policy does not react by changing the nominal interest rate in each of the strategic games. The same results holds for aggregate government spending, as this instruments reacts to the weighted average of the home and foreign cost push and fiscal shock. This implies that home government spending and foreign government spending react inversely. In the benchmark case of full coordination the reaction is less strong than in the other to cases which are under the given calibration close to each other. But setting all instruments simultaneously implies a reaction of government spending which is less than in the case of fiscal leadership and thus generating losses to a lesser extent. Figure 4 depicts the impulse response functions of the country-specific inflation rate and output gap. Under the benchmark there is no reaction in both the home and foreign inflation rate which depends in general on the weighted average of the shocks. But an increase of the home inflation rate of about 8% in case of fiscal leadership and a little less than this value in case of the Nash setting can be observed. In the benchmark case the shock is reflected in the reaction of the output gaps (a negative output gap in the case of the home country). But in the other two games there is in small reaction to a positive output gap. The foreign variables reflect the home variables inversely.
Symmetric shocks, equal country size
This section discusses the impulse response functions in the case that two countries are of the same size and are both hit by symmetric shocks, i.e. u H t = u F t = u W t and u R t = 0. As can be seen in figure 5 there is a reaction of the nominal interest rate in each of the three cases analyzed. The monetary policy has to increase the interest rate in all three settings with the highest reaction in the case of the Nash game and the lowest in the case of full coordination. Both countries are hit by the same cost-push shock and thus set their instruments in the same way with no reaction in the benchmark case. When policy instruments are set simultaneously the reaction is stronger than in the case of fiscal leadership. This result is opposite to the one described above of asymmetric shocks.
The results for the country-specific inflation and output gap in the case of symmetric shocks are astonishing as they are exactly the same no matter how the central bank and both governments interact. Moreover, the movements resemble those reactions in the case of the closed economy. In the benchmark case of full coordination a positive cost-push shock leads to a trade-off between the inflation rate and the output gap. The cost-push shock increases the inflation rate due to the Phillips curve relationship directly. Indirectly the shock increases the conditional expectations of the future interest rate through the AR(1)-structure of the shock. This implies a decrease in the output gap. As a result the central bank increases the nominal interest rate. The economy is stabilized with the help of the monetary instrument. Almost the same mechanism holds in the case of simultaneous setting of all instruments. As governments increase their spending the central bank has to react with a higher interest rate This result still holds even for various values of n. In the benchmark case of full coordination the impulse response functions for all variables do not depend on the country size n. In case of non-coordinated policies the outcomes are the same for all values of n. In this case the impulse response functions for the inflation rates and the output gaps are the are exactly the same as in the benchmark scenario. But the interest rate reacts stronger as both home and foreign government spending react to the shock. The fiscal leadership regime yields exactly the same impulse response functions for both inflation rates as in the other two scenarios.
But the results for all other scenarios vary with the country size.
Conclusion
A simple model of a two-country monetary union based on the New Keynesian framework is set up. Three policy makers, i.e. two governments and one single central banks decide over policy variables to stabilize the economy. Authorities do not coordinate but set their instruments in an uncoordinated manner or in some kind of policy regime where one (group) of the policy makers reacts to the policy decision made by the other one before. Closed analytical solutions for all variables (specially for the policy instruments) are derived for all different strategic scenarios. Moreover, the different outcomes are evaluated by comparing welfare effects. Finally, to visualize the dynamic behavior of the variables the model is simulated and impulse response functions in the case of asymmetric and symmetric shocks are depicted.
Though the structure of the model is quite simple, analytical results are no longer straightforward in some of the strategic games (specially the regime of fiscal leadership). The closed analytical results depend on the various constants of the underlying model in a non-linear way. As is shown, the direction of the effect of a shock depends on the calibration of the parameters, in particular on the country size. But nonetheless, results are comparable across the different regimes.
(tbc)
A Benchmark
Output gaps of both countries are given by equations (38) and (38)
B.1 Algebraic derivation of results
Using (12) the nominal interest rate is given bȳ
Relative government spending Assuming that
where c N ε , d N ε , c N u , d N u are the coefficients to be determined.
Plugging this into the system above, comparing the coefficients result in As −2n(1 − n) − n(2n − 1) simplifies to −n, and as (2n − 1)n(1 − n) + n(2n(n − 1) + 1) = n 2 the result for foreign government spending simplifies to Plugging this into the system above, comparing the coefficients result in 
